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Abstract—Smart grids are power distribution networks that
include a significant communication infrastructure, which is used
to collect usage data and monitor the operational status of the
grid. As a consequence of this additional infrastructure, power
networks are at an increased risk of cyber-attacks. In this letter,
we address the problem of detecting and attributing anomalies
that occur in the sub-meter power consumption measurements
of a smart grid, which could be indicative of malicious behavior.
We achieve this by clustering a set of statistical features of power
measurements that are determined using the Smoothed Pseudo
Wigner Ville (SPWV) energy Time-Frequency (TF) distribution.
We show how this approach is able to more accurately distinguish
clusters of energy consumption than simply using raw power
measurements. Our ultimate goal is to apply the principles
of profiling power consumption measurements as part of an
enhanced anomaly detection system for smart grids.
Index Terms—SCADA systems, Smart Grid, Clustering meth-
ods, Power measurement, Energy Time-Frequency Distributions
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART grids are power distribution networks that dependon an increased level of automated monitoring and con-
trol [1]. To achieve this automation, new sensors and actuators
are connected to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems via wide-area communication networks.
Alongside these SCADA systems is an Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI), which permits two-way communication
between the smart meter at the customer premises and the
utility company. Together, these systems can be used to
collect usage data and monitor the operational status of the
infrastructure. However, there are drawbacks of increased
levels of automation in the smart grid, including higher
system complexity, and a greater interdependency between
several communication protocols and middleware components.
Furthermore, a growing reliance on automation means that
security threats can cause serious disruptions.
Hence, it is crucial that any challenge to the smart grid and
supporting communications infrastructure is promptly detected
and acted upon. To do this it is necessary to detect a range of
challenges, including those that manifest as anomalies at the
This work was supported by the Brazilian MCTI/CNPq/CT-ENERG via the
ProSeG project (grant 404958/2013-3), Capes/Brazil PVE (grant 13983130)
and the EU-funded SPARKS project (grant 608224).
Angelos K. Marnerides is with the School of Computing & Mathemat-
ical Sciences, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK, e-mail:
a.marnerides@ljmu.ac.uk
Paul Smith is with the Austrian Institute of Technology (AIT), Vienna,
Austria, e-mail: paul.smith@ait.ac.at
Alberto Schaeffer-Filho is with the Institute of Informatics, Federal Uni-
versity of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre, Brazil, e-mail: al-
berto@inf.ufrgs.br
Andreas Mauthe is with the School of Computing & Communications,
Lancaster University, UK, e-mail: a.mauthe@lancaster.ac.uk
network-level (e.g., unexpected peaks in traffic volume) and
the appliance-level (e.g., non-standard energy consumption
and generation measurements). For example, data injection
attacks may be used to change measurement values of some
devices, in order to hinder the operation of the grid [2].
Further, Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia [3] describe load
altering attacks, which attempt to cause circuit overflow or
disturb the balance between power supply and demand in
the grid. Approaches for detecting network-level anomalies
in communication networks are relatively well-established.
Furthermore, some research has focused on detecting attacks
in SCADA communication protocols [4].
In this letter, we address the problem of detecting and
attributing anomalies that occur in sub-meter power measure-
ments, i.e., those for individual consumers of a smart grid.
In particular, we aim to detect the effects of load altering at-
tacks [3] that may be caused by an attacker sending direct load
control (DLC) commands to appliances, resulting in unusual
power consumption. For the clustering of power consumption
we propose a method using a statistical description of power
measurements. This is necessary because directly clustering
raw power measurements, as is for instance employed by [5],
leads to insufficient and inaccurate power consumption pro-
filing, since the measurements are non-stationary. In order
to describe the power measurements we apply the Smoothed
Pseudo Wigner Ville (SPWV) energy Time-Frequency (TF)
distribution, which results in a coherent statistical probability
distribution. Next we extract a three-dimensional feature set
that is based on the 3rd order Rényi entropy and the mean
frequency and time marginal values. These features are used
as input to a clustering algorithm that can identify groups
of residences with similar power consumption and anomalous
outliers. The latter could indicate malicious behavior.
The three TF-based features that we have used in our
analysis have, to the best of our knowledge, not previously
been applied to power measurement profiling. Using these
features we are able to clearly identify five power consumption
clusters in a dataset that was used to validate our approach.
These findings were cross-validated with the original raw
power measurements. The overall aim of this work is to apply
the principles of profiling power consumption as part of an
attack detection system that draws on multiple data sources
from the network- and appliance-level of a smart grid.
II. PROFILING OF POWER CONSUMPTION MEASUREMENTS
A. Dataset and Clustering Raw Power Measurements
The dataset1 that we used for our analysis was gathered
by the Smart* project [6], and contains anonymized average
1Smart* Dataset: http://traces.cs.umass.edu/index.php/Smart/Smart
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Fig. 1. Initial clustering with k-means by using raw power measurements.
power utilization measurements from 440 residential buildings
in western Massachusetts, USA. The measurements were
captured at one-minute intervals. In a similar fashion to
related work [5], we initially attempted to cluster the raw
power measurements with a well-known clustering scheme.
We chose to use the k-means algorithm because of its minimal
computational cost when compared to other schemes.
Initial analysis using the raw measurements indicated that
k-means clustering could not provide a clear interpretation of
the power measurements or appropriately group similar usage
patterns that are present in the dataset. This is illustrated in
Fig. 1. The graph shows that there is a number of examples
where the power utilization of a given residence is similar
to others, but they are not placed in the same cluster. We
concluded that, because of the non-stationary nature of the
measurements, this method of creating power consumption
profiles is inappropriate. In order to overcome this problem,
we looked to derive meaningful statistical features from each
raw power measurement signal before applying k-means.
B. Determining Statistical Features for Effective Clustering
To determine a set of statistical features that can be used
as input to a clustering algorithm, we compute for all the
measurement signals, i.e., the power measurements from a sin-
gle residence, their corresponding Smoothed Pseudo Wigner
Ville (SPWV) Time-Frequency (TF) distribution. Determining
a suitable probability distribution is a necessary first step in
order to derive metrics from a stochastic and non-stationary
process, i.e., the power measurements. The SPWV is a special
case of the Wigner-Ville (WV) distribution, and is derived by
the general class of the Cohen energy TF distributions [7]. The
SPWV-TF was chosen because it is capable of handling non-
stationary signals and can map their energy on the TF plane. In
addition, the SPWV-TF also addresses the constraints related
to auto, cross and interference terms that are not fully dealt
with through the original WV distribution.
In more detail, let each power measurement signal for a
given residence be denoted as s(t), and its Hilbert-based ana-
lytical form be s(u); the WV distribution which re-formulates
the general Cohen distribution is then expressed as [7]:
WV (t, ω) =
1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
s∗(t− 1
2
τ)e−jτωs(t+
1
2
τ)dτ (1)
Given this definition when τ → 0, the product of s∗(t− 12τ)
and s(t + 12τ) contributes to the integral and is coherent.
However, as indicated in [7], [8], the bilinear nature of the WV
distribution has several shortcomings regarding windowing
trade-offs, and there are cases when regional signal intensities
are indicated, even though these are expected to be zero-
valued. The interference terms that are not fully considered
by the original WV distribution [7] may be dramatically
reduced through a smoothing function ζ(τ). The function
ζ(τ) can also be designed with explicit TF smoothing kernel
functions in order to adapt sampling in real-time and enable
the efficient online computation of the SPWV over a non-
stationary measurement signal [8]. When ζ(τ) is employed in
the WV distribution in Eq. 1, we obtain the SPWV [7], [8]:
SPWV (t, ω) =
∫ +∞
−∞
ζ(τ)s(t+
τ
2
)s∗(t− τ
2
)e−jpiωτdτ (2)
Subsequently, we extract the descriptive statistics of the time
and frequency marginals alongside the 3rd order Rényi entropy
in order to characterize the resulting probability energy TF
distribution on the raw power measurements per residence.
These features are selected as they empirically lead to better
k-means clustering results when compared to other metrics
derived by the SPWV distribution, such as the resulting total
unit-less energy metric of the SPWV distribution and the 1st
order frequency and time moments.
The time (seconds) and frequency (Hz) marginals, which
jointly describe the marginal probability distribution of the
values contained within the overall SPWV probability distri-
bution, are extracted as follows:
mω(t) =
∫ +∞
−∞
SPWV (t, ω)dω (3)
where mω(t) denotes the time marginal and mt(ω) is the
frequency marginal expressed as:
mt(ω) =
∫ +∞
−∞
SPWV (t, ω)dt (4)
We compute the 3rd order Rényi entropy since it has
been shown to be a good discriminative feature in other
disciplines [9]. In particular, Baraniuk et al. [8] were able
to estimate the 3rd order Rényi entropy RαSPWV using the
following definition:
RαSPWV = −
1
2
log2
+∞∫∫
−∞
SPWV α(t, ω)dtdω (5)
The Rényi entropy is a generalization of Shannon entropy,
which provides a means of describing the level of complexity
of a signal, and is measured in bits. The entropy order is
denoted by the parameter α which in our case is α = 3.
When α = 1 we recover the Shannon entropy as well as
the Kullback-Leibler divergence [8]. Despite the fact that the
general form of the Rényi entropy depends on the entropy
order, we strictly compute it for α = 3, since lower α values
would negatively affect the complexity representation for any
Cohen-based distribution [8].
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Fig. 2. Clustering of power consumption based on TF features under
five clusters, namely: LC = Low Consumption, LMC = Low-to-Medium
Consumption, MC = Medium Consumption, HC = High Consumption, VHC
= Very High Consumption.
C. Applying k-means Clustering
Using the statistical features calculated earlier, we apply the
k-means clustering algorithm in order to group similar power
measurements, and possibly identify outliers that represent
unusual consumption patterns that could indicate malicious
behavior. We initially construct a composite i by j matrix X ,
where each row i represents a residence and each column j
represents the computed feature. In this study, i = 440 and j =
3, since there are 440 residences and three features. Then, we
apply k-means to identify the most representative k clusters.
Initially, k random rows in X are selected and marked as the
centroids for k clusters C, respectively [C1, C2, · · · , Ck]. In
our experiments, we determine the most representative number
of centroids by minimising the sum of squares within a cluster
using Eq. 6, where Xi denotes the actual row data vector that
represents a single residence from a total of M residences,
cn is a given cluster centroid of the k resulting clusters, and
||Xi − cn||2 is defined as the Euclidean distance between the
data vector for a residence and its centroid.
k∑
n=1
M∑
i=1
||Xi − cn||2 (6)
In our experiments, we apply k-means iteratively, minimiz-
ing the sum of squares within a cluster on every iteration, in
order to identify the optimal number of clusters.
III. CLUSTERING RESULTS ANALYSIS
Fig. 2 depicts the final number of clusters and provides a
visualization of the relationship between these clusters and
their corresponding ranges of TF energy statistical features.
There is a clear separation of per-residence power consumption
into five distinct clusters:
1) Low Consumption (LC): Defined by the majority, con-
sisting of 429 houses where power consumption ranges
between 0-10 kW/min;
2) Low-Medium Consumption (LMC): Defined by a set
of four residences where power consumption is between
10-70 kW/min with mild peak fluctuations;
3) Medium Consumption (MC): A single residence that
exhibits high peaks within the range of 45-120 kW/min;
4) High Consumption (HC): Mapped to a set of three
residences, in which each demonstrates mild to high
fluctuations of the average peak power and most of their
measured values range between 10-200 kW/min; and
5) Very High Consumption (VHC): A single house with an
initial consumption of 130 kW/min and extreme fluctua-
tion on its power peaks that reaches up to 530 kW/min.
This clustering approach has provided a distinct separation
of low power utilization users, which were placed in the LC
cluster. Given the visual representation of this cluster, it can
be seen that its most discriminative feature is the similar range
of values in the mean frequency marginals of the SPWV
distribution (i.e., the z-axis in Fig. 2). In particular, all houses
that belong to the LC cluster have a range of 0-210 Hz with
a mean time marginal that varied in the range of 0-1 seconds,
and the Rényi entropy for the majority of these houses ranges
between 12 and 16 bits. Moreover, none of the houses assigned
to this cluster consumed large amounts of power per minute,
as can be seen in Fig. 3.
In a similar fashion, the houses assigned to the LMC and
MC clusters had as their most distinguishable feature the
range of values for the mean frequency marginals of the
SPWV distribution. Despite their similar values for the Rényi
entropy and estimated mean time marginals, the members of
the LMC and the single member of the MC cluster showed
higher mean frequency marginals than the LC. This means
that their raw power measurements had more frequent peaks
than houses in the LC cluster. However, apart from higher
frequency marginals in its corresponding SPWV distribution,
the single house of the MC cluster had also a higher mean
time marginal with a larger power consumption compared to
the four residences in the LMC cluster, as shown in Fig. 42.
Members of the HC cluster exhibited higher mean frequency
marginals, with medium-ranged mean time marginals that
correspond to frequent fluctuations of peak power utilization.
Nevertheless, none of the houses assigned to the HC cluster
reached more than 200 kW/min on a single peak, and their
peak fluctuations did not significantly exceed their average
power peak (which was ≈ 142 kW/min). However, as in-
dicated in Fig. 5, the single house that exhibited excessive
power consumption (VHC cluster) had a sudden increase of
power utilization that remained constant for a period of 12.5
hours (i.e., 750 minutes). The behavior demonstrated by this
particular house can also be seen in Fig. 2, in which a single
point indicates a higher mean time marginal than any other
data point, as well as higher Rényi entropy.
Overall, the outcomes of our clustering approach demon-
strate that power consumption profiles can be established
based on energy TF features that are derived from the SPWV
2In Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 we show only representative houses of the LC,
LMC and HC clusters in order to more clearly demonstrate the differences in
power consumption between houses in these clusters.
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idences of the High Consumption (HC) cluster
and from the only member of the Very High
Consumption (VHC) cluster.
distribution. Consumption profiles characterized by low, low-
medium and medium utilization can be easily distinguished via
the mean time and frequency marginals. Also, the separation
of houses with higher power consumption (HC and VHC clus-
ters) can be distinguished based on the mean time marginal and
the Rényi entropy. Arguably, a shortcoming of our approach
is its inability to place residences with all-zero measurements
(shown at the origin of Fig. 2) in a unique cluster – these
measurements could be indicative of malicious behavior. Ex-
periments aimed at addressing this problem with different
numbers of clusters led to over-fitting. This issue motivates our
overall goal to integrate this profiling technique into a system
that collectively examines both appliance- and network-level
anomalies. For example, a lack of network packets from
a smart meter could indicate that physical tampering has
occurred, or network traffic is being blocked or manipulated at
an intermediate point – data from sensors that measure these
characteristics could be used to build a hypothesis regarding
the root cause of an anomaly. Furthermore, based on the
introduced scheme it will be possible to correlate and cluster
network communication and appliance-related features from a
number of sub-meters in order to adequately profile distinct
situations that are either caused by local system failures or
distributed power load attacks.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Resilient operation of smart grid communication networks
must ensure the detection of anomalies that manifest at
the network-level and the appliance-level. Although attack
detection in SCADA communication protocols has attracted
some attention recently, we advocate in this letter that it is
also necessary to detect and attribute anomalies that occur in
the appliance-level measurements. To achieve this we apply
a Smoothed Pseudo Wigner Ville (SPWV) energy Time-
Frequency (TF) distribution as a basis for creating statistical
features that describe power measurements. A significant ben-
efit of using SPWV is that the input timeseries can be non-
stationary. This is in contrast to timeseries models that are
used in commercial tools (e.g., IBM’s SPSS3) that require the
(weak) stationarity of measurements. This is a shortcoming
3IBM SPSS Statistics: http://www-01.ibm.com/software/uk/analytics/spss/
products/statistics/
that results in the need for transforming a signal, potentially
leading to errors in later analysis stages. Having applied
SPWV, we use the k-means clustering algorithm to identify
outliers that could indicate malicious behavior. Our results are
promising and we anticipate that profiling power consumption
using the techniques introduced in this letter can be part of an
enhanced anomaly detection system. Additionally, we foresee
detailed power profiles being useful for grid capacity planning
and generating accurate consumption forecasts that can be
applied for energy trading [10]. Future work will investigate
how to realize our approach in an online manner. Specifically,
we will adapt the MATLAB-based routines that we have used
for our analysis to a parallel programming model, such as
MapReduce. Furthermore, we will investigate the performance
benefits of data sampling, so that very large data volumes can
be processed in near real-time.
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